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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade or so, employers in the United States have 
dramatically increased the use of employee noncompetition agreements, 
seeking to limit the types and scope of employment in which workers 
can engage after leaving a job. “The growth of noncompete agreements 
is part of a broad shift in which companies assert ownership over work 
∗ Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. The author thanks Akron School of Law for the invitation to participate in the IP Scholars 
Forum in September 2016; the participants in the Forum for their suggestions and contributions and 
lively discussion; and the editors of the Akron Law Review for their valuable comments and for 
their time and efforts. 
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experience as well as work.”1 This is true not only for high-level 
employees in knowledge-intensive industries, but also for employees in 
a huge range of other commercial enterprises, including many low-wage 
workers in service industry jobs.2 A recent White House report cited 
research finding that eighteen percent of American workers report being 
currently bound by a non-compete, and thirty-seven percent indicate that 
they have at some point in their working lives signed such an 
agreement.3 The New York Times reports that 30 million Americans “are 
hobbled by so-called non-compete agreements, fine print in their 
employment contracts that keeps them from working for corporate rivals 
in their next job.”4 Employers also appear to have stepped up 
enforcement of noncompetition agreements. According to one study, 
there was a sixty-one percent increase in post-employment 
noncompetition lawsuits between 2002 and 2013.5 There is almost 
certainly widespread use of non-competes and pre-litigation enforcement 
that goes on under the radar, so these numbers likely undercount the 
prevalence of non-compete agreements. 
As the use and enforcement of non-competes has increased, so has 
the attention of the courts and legislatures to these agreements. In the 
last several years, there have been a number of significant state supreme 
court cases regarding non-competes, and a variety of new and amended 
1. Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N.Y. TIMES (May 
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/noncompete-clauses.html?_r=0. 
2. For example, Jimmy John’s took a great deal of heat when it was revealed that it required
all employees to sign a non-compete clause. See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-
Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-
compete_n_5978180.html?1413230622. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly 
Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html (“Noncompete 
clauses are now appearing in far-ranging fields beyond the worlds of technology, sales and 
corporations with tightly held secrets, where the curbs have traditionally been used. From event 
planners to chefs to investment fund managers to yoga instructors, employees are increasingly 
required to sign agreements that prohibit them from working for a company’s rivals”). 
3. Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses, 
White House Report, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/non-
competes_report_final2.pdf, at 3 [hereinafter White House Report]. 
4. Steve Lohr, To Compete Better, States Are Trying to Curb Noncompete Pacts, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/technology/to-compete-better-states-
are-trying-to-curb-noncompete-pacts.html.  
5. White House Report, supra note 4, at 3, citing Beck Reed Riden study. See also Ruth 
Simon & Angus Loten, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses is Rising, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323446404579011501388418552. 
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statutes passed by state legislatures.6 For the most part, the judicial and 
legislative responses to the use and enforcement of non-compete 
agreements have focused on restricting or limiting the use of those 
agreements in various ways.7 The White House and the Treasury 
Department reports also indicate a great deal of skepticism regarding the 
utility and propriety of non-competes. The Obama administration issued 
a “State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements,” in which it called 
for substantial restrictions on non-competes: “Most workers should not 
be covered by a non-compete agreement. Though each state faces 
different circumstances, we believe that employers have more targeted 
means to protect their interests, that non-compete agreements should be 
the exception rather than the rule, and that there is gross overuse of non-
compete clauses today.”8 
The concerns about non-compete agreements revolve around, first, 
the effect of the agreements on the economy and on innovation, and, 
second, the implications for workers and mobility in the labor market. 
The Treasury Department report, for example, states that while there are 
likely benefits that flow from non-compete enforcement, those “benefits 
come at the expense of workers and the broader economy.”9 The White 
House report, drawing on the Treasury Department study, also points to 
serious concerns about non-compete use and enforcement. The report: 
provides a starting place for further investigation of the problematic 
usage of one institutional factor that has the potential to hold back 
wages—non-compete agreements. These agreements currently impact 
nearly a fifth of U.S. workers, including a large number of low-wage 
workers. This brief delineates issues regarding misuse of non-compete 
agreements and describes a sampling of state laws and legislation to 
address the potentially high costs of unnecessary non-competes to 
workers and the economy.10 
6. See Lohr, supra note 5 (discussing legislative changes and efforts in Massachusetts,
Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah). 
7. See, e.g., Conn. S.B. 00351 (restricting non-competes for physicians); Ill. S.B. 3163
(“Freedom to Work” Act prohibiting non-competes for low-wage workers); Utah H.B. 0251 
(limiting non-competes to one year). 
8. State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ competition/ noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). 
9. RYAN NUNN, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2016), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-
competes%20Report.pdf.  
10. White House Report, supra note 4, at 2. 
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Indeed, there has been a great deal of legislative and judicial 
attention paid to non-compete agreements. It is not only the White 
House and academics, but also courts and legislators that are skeptical of 
the agreements. Non-competes are void as a matter of public policy in 
three states,11 and virtually all of the new legislation and common law 
development has resulted in increasing restrictions on the use of the 
agreements.12 Moreover, the general approach in the states in which the 
agreements are enforceable is a cautious one: non-competes are subject 
to a reasonableness or balancing test in nearly all jurisdictions.13 
This deep skepticism is remarkable, given the general approach that 
American law takes to contract formation and enforcement: “freedom of 
contract” generally means that courts will not look into the terms of an 
agreement or the adequacy of exchange.14 But with respect to non-
compete agreements, every state requires such an examination,15 except 
where the agreements are flatly prohibited.16 In the jurisdictions that 
prohibit non-competes entirely, the justification is generally that the free 
flow of labor is more important than whatever interests weigh in favor of 
non-compete enforcement: protection of business interests, a need to 
protect trade secrets, etc.17 And even in the states in which non-competes 
are permissible under some circumstances the concern for the free flow 
of labor is significant. In both cases, the skepticism of the law toward 
non-competition echoes concerns regarding the master-servant 
11. Most notably, California bans non-compete agreements. Cal. Business & Professions 
Code § 16600. 
12. See Lohr, supra note 5; see also infra page 33-34, Recent Legislative Action. 
13. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 943
(2012) (noting that while there are a variety of approaches to non-competes, many states scrutinize 
the agreements closely and that “not a single state takes a pure private ordering approach . . .”). 
14. There are exceptions, of course. In a few other areas, courts are much more likely to look
into the nature and terms of the agreement or the process by which agreement was reached. For 
example, prenuptial agreements receive additional scrutiny, and in the real property context, 
landlord-tenant agreements. Both of these examples are notable, in that they involve both situations 
of asymmetrical bargaining (potentially) and a set of dignitary interests that justify treating the 
agreements as something other than, or in addition to, basic elements of free market exchange. 
15. See Moffat, supra note 14, at 947. For a comprehensive survey, see Beck Reed Riden
LLP, Employee Noncompetes, A State by State Survey, http://www.beckreedriden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/noncompetes-50-state-survey-chart-20170204.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 
2017). 
16. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600. See also North Dakota Non-Compete Law Shares
History with California, JACKSONLEWIS.COM, http://www.noncompetereport.com/2013/01/north-
dakota-non-compete-law-shares-history-with-california/. The restrictions in California and North 
Dakota flow from their adoption of the Field Code in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
17. Omri Ben-Shahar, California Got It Right: Ban The Non-Compete Agreements, FORBES 
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/10/27/california-got-it-right-
ban-the-non-compete-agreements/#487b8e1c3538. 
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relationship and the history of indentured servitude.18 
With this history in mind, it is no surprise that employee non-
compete agreements are treated differently from other kinds of contracts. 
The subject matter of non-competes is people—human beings—and the 
goal of those agreements is to control that human capital. This history is 
important, both because it goes some way to explaining the current 
posture of the law toward non-compete agreements, and because it helps 
frame the conversation in a way that takes account of factors other than 
employers’ justifications and arguments in favor of non-compete 
agreements. 
It is important to understand the employers’ arguments, however. 
The majority of the discussion regarding non-competes focuses on 
efficiency and utilitarian arguments, but until a dispute reaches 
litigation, employers need not provide any sort of justification for asking 
employees to sign the agreements. When employers do explain their 
motivations, the reasons often sound like the justifications for 
intellectual property protection.19 Sometimes this is explicit: employers 
will indicate that they need non-competes as an additional protection 
against trade secret theft, as a sort of meta-IP protection.20 In other 
situations, the IP justification is more implicit: employers will assert that 
the agreements are necessary to protect their investment of resources and 
training in an employee or because that is what is required for employers 
to disclose confidential or trade secret information to employees. This is 
a classic IP justification—some form of right or form of protection is 
necessary in order to provide a sufficient incentive for the creation and 
dissemination of valuable intangible goods.21 
In any event, the effect of non-compete agreements is to treat 
human capital as a form of intellectual property: with non-competes, 
human capital becomes an intangible but alienable form of property, 
exchanged—albeit in a limited way—for valuable consideration.22 
18. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960)
(citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), for its discussion of and concerns about 
restraints being imposed on apprentices by their masters). 
19. Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 899-904 (2010). 
20. See White House Report, supra note 4, at 4. The report states at the outset that “[t]he 
main economically and societally beneficial uses of non-competes are to protect trade secrets, which 
can promote innovation, and to incentivize employers to invest in worker training because of 
reduced probability of exit from the firm.”   
21. In many situations, the reasons go unstated, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
in some cases the agreements are nothing more than anti-competitive restraints on trade. 
22. There are many instances in which the employer provides nothing more than continued
employment in exchange for the employee’s forbearance from certain kinds of future employment. 
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Taking the IP approach means thinking about the utilitarian notions that 
typically underlie the grant of IP rights under United States law and 
considering them in the context of human capital. It further means 
clarifying the terms on which we might consider treating human capital 
as IP: what is the subject matter of the intellectual property right? Who 
owns it, and how may it be transferred? What defenses exist? What are 
the boundaries of this form of IP, and how does it relate to and interact 
with other forms of intellectual property? 
Even a brief foray into this territory reveals that the intellectual 
property paradigm is an uncomfortable one, at best. Perhaps 
surprisingly, it is the IP analysis that surfaces the dignitary concerns. 
When one thinks carefully about whether human capital should be 
considered a form of intellectual property, the personal autonomy and 
dignitary implications rise to the forefront. Likewise, non-competes, 
when used as tools for protecting intellectual property-like things, should 
also be considered in IP terms.23 
In this article, I first provide a brief background on the ways that 
non-compete agreements are used by U.S. employers and the 
justifications that are often used for the imposition and enforcement of 
the agreements, as well as an overview of the current academic and 
policy debates concerning non-competes. In the second part, I turn to a 
discussion of human capital as intellectual property, taking seriously this 
justification for non-competes and seeking to approach human capital in 
the same terms that we would evaluate other forms of intellectual 
property. This thought experiment makes clear that human capital does 
not fit well within the intellectual property paradigm. This should tip the 
scale in terms of non-compete enforceability and, at a minimum, means 
that the agreements should be enforceable only on grounds unrelated to 
the intellectual property justification. 
Some states have moved to require something more in the way of consideration, see, e.g., Lucht’s 
Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058 (Colo. 2011) and Std. Register Co. v. Keala, No. 
14-00291 JMS-RLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73695 (D. Haw. June 8, 2015), and this is yet another 
example of the ways in the which non-competes are treated differently than other contracts, in 
which a “peppercorn” of consideration is sufficient and neither courts nor legislatures would inquire 
into the adequacy of consideration. 
23. I explored this notion in a previous article, arguing that non-competition agreements are
not a good method of protecting intellectual property items. They are, at the same time, both under- 
and over-broad, and they impose a variety of negative externalities. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra 
note 20, at 911-20. 
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I. BACKGROUND
As the recent White House and Treasury Department reports detail, 
the use and enforcement of non-compete agreements is becoming more 
widespread in not only the knowledge-intensive industries where we 
might expect to find them, but also in a variety of contexts we would not 
expect, such as low-wage service jobs.24 
A notable example in the service industry context arose when it was 
revealed that Jimmy John’s, the sandwich shop chain, included a non-
compete clause in every one of its employment agreements. Each 
employee, in accepting the job, was prohibited for two years following 
the end of employment with Jimmy John’s from working at any other 
business that sold “submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita, and/or wrapped 
or rolled sandwiches” within two miles of any Jimmy John’s location.25 
Jimmy John’s has approximately 2,400 locations in forty-six  states, and 
the non-compete agreement thus meant as a practical matter that a 
former Jimmy John’s employee might have a very difficult time finding 
similar employment upon leaving Jimmy John’s.26 When this provision 
came to light, there was a great deal of publicity, an investigation by the 
Illinois attorney general, and lawsuits. Jimmy John’s eventually settled 
the suits and eliminated the non-compete provision from its employment 
agreements, but this was not an isolated example.27 
It is not just particular industries or specific geographic areas in 
which non-compete agreements have proliferated. They are omnipresent 
in the high-tech world, and appear in agreements in a range of fields, 
from mechanics to computer programmers, from hair stylists to 
doctors.28 
As the use of non-competes has gone up, more attention has been 
paid to non-competes in the last five or ten years. Scholars have debated 
the effects of the agreements on the economy and on the rate of 
innovation, as well as the implications for workers and the labor 
market.29 Legislatures have proposed and passed a wide range of bills, 
24. See White House Report, supra note 4, at 3; see also NUNN, supra note 10, at 19 n.35. 
25. Jimmy John’s Will Stop Making Low-Wage Employees Sign Non-Compete Agreements, 
REUTERS (Jun. 22, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-non-compete-agreements/. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Notably, they are virtual absent for lawyers. It is worth considering whether courts and
lawyers would think of non-competes differently if they were regularly subject to them. 
29. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal 
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251 (2015); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, 
Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: the Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via 
Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963; Matthew Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee 
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most of them aimed at restricting the use of non-compete agreements.30 
And, finally, the courts have been active as well, regularly considering 
challenges to non-compete agreements and in many cases, as with the 
legislatures, limiting the use or enforcement of non-compete 
agreements.31 
Scholars from the law and business worlds have recently focused 
attention on non-competes, with the bulk of the discussion revolving 
around the effects of non-competes on the markets—the economic 
ecosystem, the labor market, and the rates of innovation and growth. 
Since Annemarie Saxenian32 and Ronald Gilson33 kicked off a 
discussion about the effects of non-compete enforcement, and argued 
that California’s ban on non-compete agreements gave it a “regional 
advantage” in attracting talent and producing growth because of the 
labor mobility and spillover of talent, a variety of scholars from multiple 
disciplines have continued to debate the question of the relative merits of 
non-competes. 
Professor Lobel, in her book Talent Wants to Be Free, picked up on 
Gilson’s and Saxenian’s arguments, contending that increased labor 
mobility is a net benefit to workers, to firms, and to the economy.34 This 
account has not gone uncontested, however. For example, Ted 
Sichelman and Jonathan Barnett take a new look at the data and argue 
that non-compete enforcement, or the lack thereof, is not nearly as 
significant a factor as Lobel, Saxenian, and Gilson contend.35 In their 
article, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets, Barnett and 
Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 
RESEARCH POLICY, no. 2, 394-404 (2015); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth 
Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013); Matt Marx, Good Work If You 
Can Get It . . . Again: Non-Compete Agreements, “Occupational Detours,” and Attainment 16 
(Mass. Inst. Tech. Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter Marx, Good Work], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456748. 
30. See supra note 8. 
31. See, e.g., Durrell v. Tech Elecs., Inc., 2016 WL 6696070 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (holding that
continuation of at-will employment not sufficient consideration for enforcing non-compete 
agreement); Robinson v. U-Haul Company of California, 4 Cal. App. 5th 304 (2016) (affirming the 
public policy interest of the state of California in not enforcing non-competes). 
32. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON 
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, (Harv. Univ. Press 1996). 
33. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
34. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING, (Yale Univ. Press 2013). 
35. Jonathan Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets 
(USC CLASS Research Paper No. 16-13; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 16-15, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854. See also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 
30. 
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Sichelman conclude that 
[t]here is little to no persuasive support for any causal relationship be-
tween banning noncompetes, on the one hand, and increasing employ-
ee turnover and innovation, on the other hand. Although restrictive
policies may further normative aims such as personal autonomy and
distributive fairness, there is currently no compelling reasons from an
efficiency perspective – the perspective primarily adopted by propo-
nents of noncompete bans – to impose a flat ban on noncompetes and
other contractual limitations on employee mobility.36
Barnett and Sichelman note at the outset of their study that “[t]he 
conventional view of noncompetes rests on the efficiency rationale that 
drives all IP rights: without some period of exclusivity, a firm has 
difficulty earning returns on the investment in its human capital 
assets.”37 It is an underlying assumption of much of the literature that 
non-competes are a form of intellectual property protection and, thus, 
that human capital is an IP asset. Barnett and Sichelman acknowledge 
this: “Just like IP rights, however, there is a tradeoff. Noncompetes may 
also preclude otherwise efficient employment relationships and, over 
time, diminish innovation by impeding the circulation of intellectual 
capital (as well as raise personal autonomy concerns).”38 While the 
discussion of the efficiency implications is quite robust in the literature, 
the personal autonomy and dignitary concerns are often treated in this 
parenthetical fashion.39 
Interestingly, it is when the IP rationale for non-competes is taken 
seriouslyand taken to its logical conclusionthat the personal 
autonomy concerns rise to the surface. And when they are clarified in 
this way, the enforceability of non-compete agreements is deeply 
troubling. Moreover, it almost goes without saying that the efficiency 
and utilitarian arguments are not even deployed in discussions about 
non-competes that are directed at low-wage workers and in low-IP 
industries.40 In those cases, the personal autonomy and dignitary 
concerns, as well as the straightforward economic interests of the 
36. Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5. 
37. Id. at 3. 
38. Id. 
39. To be fair, Barnett and Sichelman do not claim to be taking account of these issues, and
their conclusion is directed only to the efficiency rationales put forth regarding non-compete 
enforcement. “In short, from an efficiency perspective, current evidence provides little compelling 
support for abandoning the traditional measured approach toward enforcing non-competes and other 
contractual limitations on employee mobility in innovation markets.” Id. at 54. 
40. There is virtually no defense of non-compete enforcement in the context of low-wage 
workers in either the scholarly literature or the policy discussions. 
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workers, should take precedence. 
II. THE LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE IP JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-
COMPETES 
Employers, scholars, judges, and others seem to take it as a given 
that non-competes function as a form of IP protection.41 This premise is 
rarely explored, however, nor is the corollary that human capital is being 
treated as a new form of intellectual property. When attention has been 
paid to the IP rationale, the focus is on the efficiency aspect of non-
competes: does non-compete enforcement help or hinder economic 
development? Is there more innovation in states where non-competes are 
disfavored or prohibited? What knowledge spillovers result from 
increased employee mobility?42 
These are important questions, to be sure, but concerns regarding 
personal autonomy and dignitary interests are not often explored.43 
Perhaps surprisingly, by thinking through the IP justification carefully, 
this set of concerns rises to the surface and becomes more troubling. Put 
another way, when human capital is considered a form of intellectual 
property, the IP paradigm begins to seem inapt. 
To be clear, the subject of non-compete agreements is human 
capital, and to take the efficiency and utilitarian arguments at face value 
is to say that human capital is a form of intellectual property. The logical 
extension of treating human capital as a form of intellectual property and 
of justifying non-competes as an appropriate form of protection for that 
IP is to evaluate those arguments in IP terms. In other words, if non-
competes are justified on an IP theory they should be held to the 
standards employed there. This means thinking about the policies that 
animate patent law, copyright law, and trade secret law and about the 
doctrines that define the subject matter of the IP at issue, the rights 
attendant to that subject matter, the defenses that cabin those rights, and 
the ways in which the IP regimes relate to each other.44 
If human capital is a form of intellectual property, a series of 
41. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra note 20, at 898. 
42. See generally Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5. 
43. See, e.g., Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5 (“Although restrictive policies may
further normative aims such as personal autonomy and distributive fairness, there is currently no 
compelling reason from an efficiency perspective—the perspective primarily adopted by proponents 
of noncompete bans—to impose a flat ban on noncompetes and other contractual limitations on 
employee mobility.”). 
44. The analogy to trademark law is not as apt because of its primary focus on consumer
interests rather than property-like controls, and also because employers do not tend to make 
arguments related to trademark-like concerns when they discuss and enforce non-competes.  
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questions follows: does human capital have the characteristics usually 
associated with other forms of IP?  Do we need some sort of exclusive 
right to ensure sufficient investment in or creation of human capital? 
What is the subject matter of the thing being protected and what rights 
accompany ownership? Who owns it initially? How may it be 
transferred? How long do the rights last? What defenses exist? What are 
the boundary principles and how does this form of protection interact 
with other forms of IP protection? 
In this section I walk through these questions as a kind of thought 
experiment, and that thought experiment reveals that IP is not a good 
paradigm for human capital and thus that the law’s skepticism regarding 
non-competes is justified and should, in fact, go further. 
A. Is Human Capital Like Other Forms of IP?
Intellectual property differs in significant ways from real property,
and those differences explain many of the statutory and doctrinal 
distinctions between the two forms.45 Most obviously, intellectual 
property is intangible, rather than tangible. In many instances, this 
makes intellectual property a public good: a thing for which the benefits 
are diffuse and inure to all, but for which the costs of creation are both 
high and difficult to spread across society.46 It is not only intellectual 
property that is considered a public good: lighthouses and national 
defense are two of the standard examples of public goods.47 Intellectual 
property is deemed to provide a public benefit—in the increased 
availability of life-saving medicines, for example, or the publication of 
culture-enhancing novels and musical compositions. Those items are 
thought to benefit society generally, but the costs of creating and 
developing such things are focused on the creators. This is because of 
two characteristics of intellectual property (and public goods generally): 
45. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1 (Aspen 6th ed.) (discussing the 
differences between real property and intellectual property and the resulting differences in legal 
treatment). 
46. See id. at 13: 
(Economists generally offer lighthouses and national defense as examples of public
goods, since it is virtually impossible to provide the benefits of either one only to paying
clients. It is impossible, for example, to exclude some ships and not others from the ben-
efits of a lighthouse. Further, the use of the lighthouse by one ship does not deplete the
value of its hazard warning to others. . . . For these reasons, the market will in theory un-
dersupply such goods because producers cannot reap the marginal (incremental) value of
their investment in providing them).
47. Id. 
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it is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous.48 IP is non-exclusive because once 
it is out in the world, access to it is difficult to control, and non-rivalrous 
because one person’s use and enjoyment of it does not diminish the use 
or enjoyment of others. 
All of this is to say that public goods are just that“public” in 
some fundamental waybut in the absence of some form of incentive or 
other form of support or protection, there is unlikely to be sufficient 
incentive to create and disseminate such things. We have addressed this 
problem in some cases by having a government provide the public good, 
as in the case of lighthouses and national defense. With intellectual 
property, we have addressed the issue not by funding IP creation through 
the government (although that happens to some extent in a variety of 
industries—scientific research and arts grants, for example) but by 
allowing for a private exclusive right to control the intellectual property, 
analogous—but not identical—to a real property interest.49 
A threshold question, then, is whether we should think of human 
capital as a public good. This presents immediate problems. Human 
capital is a valuable resource that benefits society, certainly, but it is 
both rivalrous and exclusive: rivalrous because it cannot be exploited by 
an unlimited number of people, and exclusive because it is located in an 
individual rather than a thing, tangible or intangible. A person’s talents 
and efforts can, of course, inure to the benefit of many, but it is the 
output—the results—of those talents and effort that are more easily 
conceived of as a public good, not the person herself.50 
Even at this threshold stage of the inquiry, then, thinking of human 
capital as a form of IPanalogous to a new song or a groundbreaking 
drugpresents awkward questions. It is one thing to talk about 
lighthouses or new cancer mediations as public goods, but it is difficult 
to find the language to think about human capital in those terms, even if 
there are ways in which human capital shares some of the characteristics 
of a public good. 
B. The Utilitarian Approach: Do We Need to Provide an Incentive for
the Creation of or Investment in Human Capital?
IP protection in the United States is based on an efficiency or
48. Id. at 2. 
49. Id. at 13 (“ . . . government has created intellectual property rights in an effort to give
authors and inventors control over the use and distribution of their ideas, thereby encouraging them 
to invest in the production of new ideas and works of authorship”). 
50. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra note 20, at 914 n.160 (citing Marx, Good Work, supra 
note 30). 
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utilitarian rationale.51 Though the framers of the Constitution disliked 
the notion of monopoly, it was deemed necessary to provide some sort 
of exclusive right for “writings” and “discoveries” because of their 
public goods characteristics.52 The concern was—and is—that in the 
absence of some form of protection or incentive (or direct funding), a 
sufficient level of public goods is unlikely to be produced. Patent law, 
copyright law, and trade secret law are all premised upon the 
consequences of this utilitarian notion: we justify the provision of some 
form of exclusive rights in order to incentivize a sufficient level of 
invention, creation, investment, and dissemination. And, in theory at 
least, those rights are not justified if they do not create such an incentive. 
In patent law and copyright law, this notion is enshrined in the 
Constitution. Article I, section 8 sets forth the powers of Congress, and 
clause 8 is the only one of those grants of power that contains prefatory 
language. Congress may “secure exclusive” rights to authors and 
inventors, but the provision indicates that it is in order “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”53 This is widely understood to 
require some degree of justification of copyright and patent rights on an 
incentive theory: if the proposed legislation provides exclusive rights but 
does not in any way “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” 
Congress ought not have the authority to enact such legislation. 
Since 1879, when the Supreme Court struck down trademark 
legislation that was premised on the intellectual property clause,54 the 
Court has not rejected legislation on these grounds. The Court has, 
however, considered challenges to copyright and patent legislation and 
indicated that the “Progress” clause does indeed provide some limitation 
on congressional authority.55 Trade secret law, although not based upon 
51. See Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 11 (“Utilitarian theory, and the
economic framework built upon it, has long provided the dominant paradigm for analyzing and 
justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection.”). 
52. Id. at 12. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
54. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
If the symbol, however plain, simple, old, or well known, has been first appropriated by
the claimant as his distinctive trademark, he may by registration secure the right to its
exclusive use. While such legislation may be a judicious aid to the common law on the
subject of trademarks, and may be within the competency of legislatures whose general
powers embrace that class of subjects, we are unable to see any such power in the consti-
tutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and discoveries).
Id. 
55. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012)
(holding that the clause contemplates incentives for dissemination of creative works, in addition to 
incentives for the creation of those works). 
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the constitutional grant of rights to Congress, and until recently solely 
the province of state law,56 is also animated by notions of utilitarianism 
and incentive theory, among other justifications.57 
In considering human capital as a form of IP, then, one must pose 
the question of whether providing some kind of right in human capital 
would create an incentive for the creation and dissemination of, or 
investment in, human capital.  Even that simple statement is jarring: the 
notion of providing an exclusive right in human capital (other than to the 
individual in question) creates echoes of indentured servitude, even 
slavery. Non-competes are not tantamount to servitude, of course, but 
the law’s skepticism of the agreements derives in part from this 
history.58 
Employers regularly assert the “need” for non-compete agreements, 
often based on some version of an incentive or utilitarian theory. An 
employer might argue that a non-compete agreement would provide an 
incentive for investment in the training and education of an employee, 
and that it would also encourage the employer to entrust the employee 
with sensitive and confidential information such that the employee 
would be better positioned to create value for the employer.59 So there is 
a plausible incentive story to be told with respect to non-compete 
agreements,60 but that does not make the employee-side arguments about 
the detriments of non-competes less compelling. Just as Congress and 
the courts have been hesitant to confer exclusive rights in other forms of 
IP without a showing of a public benefit, such as the increased creation 
and dissemination of useful or expressive works, we ought to examine 
the proffered justifications for the use of non-competes. Thus far, the 
efficiency arguments have received vastly more attention, from 
proponents and opponents of non-competes alike, than have arguments 
regarding personal autonomy.61 
56. The Defend Trade Secrets Act was passed by Congress in 2016, and does not preempt but 
rather supplements the state-level protections that exist in nearly every state. 
57. Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 37-38. 
58. See Blake, supra note 19. 
59. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 
J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980). 
60. It is a matter of some debate whether this is actually the case. Employers assert that they
will invest more and can disclose more to employees bound by non-competes, but there is little 
evidence either way. Moreover, it’s not clear whether the spillover effects of being able to freely 
hire employees from other firms outweigh the benefits that might accrue from having a large 
number of employees bound by non-competes from changing jobs. See, e.g., Marx, Good Work, 
supra note 30. 
61. But see, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 970. 
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As a practical matter, the anticompetitive effects for employees of 
non-compete agreements can be substantial.62 Employees bound by non-
competes tend to have less bargaining power and lower wages or salaries 
than those free of restriction.63 In many cases, the restrictions can be 
broad enough to keep an employee from working in his or her profession 
for some period of time, leading to career detours and periods of 
unemployment.64 And for low-wage workers and employees in many 
service industries, there is hardly even a pretense of an efficiency or 
utilitarian justification, so the personal autonomy arguments should be 
even more compelling in those contexts. In general, however, it is 
unclear that there are any benefits at all to employees in being bound by 
non-compete agreements. 
To be fair, employers do not seek a property right in this context, so 
the reference to the history of servitude may be a bit overwrought. But, 
while there is a plausible incentive story to be told about human capital, 
it is not a particularly powerful narrative, and the counter-narrative is 
strong. The debate has largely focused on whether the evidence that a 
prohibition on non-competes leads to substantially increased innovation 
and economic development is powerful enough to justify such a 
prohibition. The question should be asked the other way around: is there 
sufficient evidence that the benefits of enforcing non-competes outweigh 
the many and troubling concerns with the agreements? 
C. Defining the Scope of the Subject Matter
Assuming that it is plausible to treat human capital as a form of IP
and that some form of protection is both justified and necessary, the next 
step should be defining the scope of the subject matter. All of our 
intellectual property regimes define the scope and subject matter of the 
IP, just as real property interests are defined by metes and bounds 
descriptions. 
Identifying the subject matter of the intellectual property right 
serves both theoretical and evidentiary purposes. Intangibles are not 
subject to metes and bounds descriptions in the way that real property is, 
but the patent, copyright, and trade secret statutes aim to define the 
62. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 970. See generally LOBEL, supra note 35; Cynthia 
L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as
a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379 (2006).
63. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive
Compensation, and Firm Investment, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Nov. 3, 2009, at 13-14, 44, 
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2009/11/03/jleo.ewp033.full.pdf+html. 
64. Marx, Good Work, supra note 30. 
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subject matter that they protect in other ways. Patentable, copyrightable, 
and trade secret subject matter are all defined both by what they protect 
and what they do not protect, and substantial portions of the case law are 
occupied by this topic. This is almost certainly in part because it is 
particularly difficult to describe and define an intangible thing. In 
addition, the attention paid to defining the subject matter makes clear 
that the intellectual property regimes are not separate silos, but instead 
an interconnected system in which the subject matters of each regime 
relate to the others.65 
Patent law protects “inventions”“anything under the sun made by 
man”66the precise definition of which is constantly evolving under 
Supreme Court scrutiny and Congressional amendment.67 
Notwithstanding this change over time, the Patent Act has included 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.68 
Moreover, the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
must be novel,69 useful,70 and nonobvious.71 Merely from this statement, 
it should be obvious that there are many, many inventions that are not 
protected by the Patent Act, and this is consistent with an incentive 
theory: for example, it does not promote the progress of science and 
useful arts to provide exclusive rights in a non-novel invention, or an 
obvious one. 
Copyright law, for its part, protects “original expression,” or 
creative works,72 including literary works, musical works, and pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.73 Perhaps more telling than what 
copyright law covers is what it does not protect. Though the bar for 
originality or creativity is quite low, the exclusion of non-original works 
from copyright’s subject matter is linked to the utilitarian approach. 
Merely copying the work of another is not consistent with the idea of 
“progress.” In other words, there is no public benefit in conferring 
exclusive rights in an item that already exists in the world, and no need 
to provide any incentive for its creation. 
65. See generally Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 24-25. 
66. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the legislative history).
67. See, e.g., the recent series of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject, from Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), to Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 
U.S. 66 (2012), to Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
68. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
69. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
70. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
71. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”) 
73. Id. 
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Copyright law also excludes ideas, methods, or useful articles.74 
Those items may be patentable, or they may simply be in the public 
domain, falling in between the two methods of protection. While the 
creative expression in a novel or a musical composition may be 
protected, a beautifully designed bicycle rack is not copyrightable.75 
(And though it falls within the subject matter of patent law, it will only 
receive protection if it satisfies the various hurdles the Patent Act 
imposes, such as novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.) So, copyright 
law does not protect useful items, and patent law only protects useful 
inventions, creating a boundary—or really a territory—between the two. 
Describing trade secret law by what is not protected is also a useful 
exercise. As is obvious from its name, items or information that are not 
secret, but are instead known or readily ascertainable, are not properly 
the subject of trade secret law.76 And again this is consistent with a 
utilitarian approachallowing proprietary rights in public information is 
both inefficient and consumer-unfriendly. Under our approach to 
intellectual property protection, we only do such a thing under the fairly 
rigorous standards of the Patent Act or the Copyright Act, and the 
disclosure of the information is part of the quid pro quo by which 
exclusive rights are granted.77 Granting those rights after disclosure 
would be counter-productive in efficiency terms. 
Trade secret law differs from patent and copyright law in that it 
defines its subject matter to a large extent by the way in which it is 
treated, rather than by the form of the work.78 Only subject matter that is 
secretor at least relatively secret and subject to reasonable measures to 
maintain that secrecymay be protected under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act and under the new federal trade secrets act.79 Any “valuable 
information” that falls within this definition may be protected, but again 
there are some boundary principles that limit the reach of trade secret 
protection. The owner of a trade secret must choose between patent 
protection and continued secrecy, as the contents of a patent application 
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery . . .”) 
75. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
76. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985); Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016, Pub. L. 114-153. 
77. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210-17 (2003) (discussing the quid pro
quo entailed in the Copyright Act and, to a lesser extent, in the Patent Act). 
78. Under the Unif. Trade Secrets Act, something is protected as a trade secret when it is
valuable and “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy.” 
79. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-153 
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will be published after eighteen months;80 the Patent Act contemplates 
that the owner or inventor discloses the information to the public in 
exchange for the patent right.81 The same is not true for copyright law; 
we do not require disclosure as the price of copyright protection, but the 
vast majority of expressive works are impossible to distribute and 
exploit while at the same time remaining secret.82 
While many intangible goods are indeed difficult to describe in 
words or are problematic in terms of providing a sample or a copy for 
evidentiary purposes, it is even more complicated to seek to define 
“human capital” as a form of IP in a way that would provide a useful and 
sufficiently cabined scope, and in a way that would help make clear its 
relationship with other forms of IP. Human capital seems substantially 
less capable of definition than other forms of IP. Wikipediafar from a 
definitive source, but a useful place to start describes human capital as 
the “stock of knowledge, habits, social, and personality attributes, 
including creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to 
produce economic value.”83 The Encyclopedia of Economics, not a 
definitive source either, defines human capital in a way that 
differentiates it from other kinds of intangibles: “economists regard 
expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on as 
investments in human capital. They are called human capital because 
people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or 
values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical 
assets.”84 
Given these definitions, human capital differs in some fundamental 
ways from other forms of IP. Like other kinds of IP, human capital is 
intangible, and it does have some of the characteristics of non-
excludability and non-rivalrousness that other forms of public goods 
have. But it is nonetheless much more difficult to conceive of human 
capital as a divisible thing, and that difficulty makes the property 
conception of a bundle of sticks less analogous. In other words, human 
80. 35 U.S.C. § 122. 
81. Note, Benjamin N. Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011-13 (2005). 
82. Computer source code is a significant exception to this general rule, as it is much easier
to keep secret than most expressive works. 
83. Human Capital, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_capital (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2016) (stating that human capital can be described in individual or aggregate terms. “Many 
theories explicitly connect investment in human capital development to education, and the role of 
human capital in economic development, productivity growth, and innovation has frequently been 
cited as a justification for government subsidies for education and job skills training”). 
 84.  Human Capital, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2016). 
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capital is perhaps less capable of being circumscribed and limited in 
ways that would make it possible to convey it, or portions of it, in the 
same ways that other forms of intellectual property are transferred. 
An employer may obtain a quasi-exclusive right in a worker’s 
labor, talents, and skills during the period of employment, but this is 
generally conceived of in agency and employment law terms.85 An 
employee owes duties of loyalty and care, and in some cases a fiduciary 
duty, to an employer.86 This differs substantially from a property rights 
notion, and it is difficult to articulate how one would define the metes 
and bounds, the subject matter, of a property-like right in human capital. 
And while the output of human (employee) ingenuity—a patentable 
invention or a new creative work, for example—can be understood in 
discrete terms, the same is not true of human capital. The “thingness,” 
which exists even with intangibles, simply is not present. 
D. What Rights are Included?
The subject matter definitions and carve-outs in patent law and
copyright law and trade secret law define the scope of the thing sought 
to be protected, just as real property is defined by its metes and bounds 
and personal property by its tangible “thingness.” These definitions are 
critical to the rights-holder’s ability to exclude.87 Both real property 
rights and intellectual property rights consist of a “bundle of sticks.” 
Once the metes and bounds of the right have been determined, the 
question is what kinds of rights should be conferred on the owner. As 
with real property, the core principle is a right to exclude.88 Just as a 
property owner can keep people off her parcel of property, a patent 
holder can prevent others from making or selling the invention covered 
by the patent and a copyright holder can enjoin copying, at least under 
some circumstances.89 
Patent, copyright, and trade secret rights may be assigned or 
licensed, just as real property may be sold or rented, and the rights are 
divisible. The Patent Act confers a set of negative rightsto prevent 
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, §1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01  (AM. LAW INST. 2009); (employees breach their duty of loyalty to the 
employer by competing with the employer while employed by the employer) (emphasis added). 
86. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a). 
87. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, (Harvard Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 14-26, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2449321 (“The right 
to exclude is a sine qua non of debates over property”). 
88. Id. 
89. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (providing that courts may grant injunctions for patent infringement); 17
U.S.C. § 502 (courts may grant injunctions in copyright cases). 
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others from making, using, or selling the invention90and those rights 
may be assigned or licensed in whole or in part. The owner may license, 
exclusively or non-exclusively, the right to make the invention, for 
example, or simply the right to prevent others from selling the invention. 
In the alternative, the owner may transfer by assignment all the rights in 
the patent to another person or entity. 
Similarly, the copyright owner can assign all the rights in the 
creative work. In the alternative, the owner may dole the rights out 
individually, licensing the film rights to a production studio, the 
serialization rights to a publisher, and the right to make action figures to 
yet another party, for example.91 A copyright owner has the right to 
control copies of the work, the right of distribution, and the right to 
control derivative works, among others.92 
The rights in patents and copyrights are property-like rights, 
whereas trade secret rights are tort-like rights: a trade secret owner does 
not have the right to exclude—if another person discovers and invents 
the same trade secret, that owner may exploit the work—but rather has a 
right against misappropriation.93 Nonetheless, a trade secret owner may 
by contract convey part or all of the rights in the trade secret. 
If the core notion of an intellectual property right is the right to 
exclude, that paradigm does not seem to be a good fit for thinking about 
rights in human capital. It is the “thingness” of both real (and even 
intellectual) property that allows for exclusion. In the context of human 
capital, the analogy is complicated. Would the right to exclude with 
respect to human capital mean that someone other than the person in 
whom the human capital resides could exercise that right? The property 
rights paradigm simply fails in this context. 
Other legal regimes do present an alternative, however. As we saw 
above, trade secret law takes a tort-like approach to protecting rights-
owners. This is not dissimilar from the agency and employment law 
principles that bind employees during the term of employment.94 It is 
settled and uncontroversial that an employee may not compete with an 
employer while she is employed,95 but this obligation does not extend 
into the post-employment period. That is, employees are not prohibited 
90. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (“ . . . whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention  . . . infringes the patent”). 
91. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (a copyright owner has not just the right to take advantage of the rights
conferred by the act but to authorizes others to do so). 
92. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth the exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
93. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) (defining misappropriation). 
94. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2009). 
95. Id. 
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by agency-like obligations from competing with a former employer. 
Thus, employers have turned to contract as the way to control post-
employment human capital. 
In some ways, contract operates in ways that are less problematic in 
the context of controlling human capital. A property right would present 
thorny problems, including potential Thirteenth Amendment concerns.96 
Contracts, on the other hand, are not rights against the world, as property 
rights are. In most situations, contracts are not perpetual, they require 
clear terms, and, importantly here, they require voluntary agreement. 
When a relevant concern is the free flow of labor, the voluntariness of an 
agreement should be a compelling consideration. In other words, if an 
employee willingly enters into a non-compete agreement with her 
employer, should we second-guess that choice? 
In fact, courts and legislatures do second-guess that choice and they 
consistently treat non-compete agreements differently than most other 
kinds of agreements. While the freedom of contract notion in most other 
circumstances means that courts will not look into the adequacy of 
exchange in an agreement, or police the terms in (hardly) any way, 
nearly every state imposes much more severe restrictions on non-
compete agreements, regularly examines the terms for reasonableness 
and fairness, and engages in a balancing test that takes public policy into 
account (much like the quid pro quo of the patent and copyright systems 
takes account of the benefits that might accrue to the public).97 Non-
compete agreements are flatly unenforceable in a few states—most 
notably California98—and are viewed skeptically in most other 
jurisdictions.99 Moreover, there has been a great deal of change in the 
law of non-competes in the last several years, and nearly all of the court 
cases and nearly all of the new legislation has moved in the direction of 
increasing restrictions on non-compete enforceability.100 
As described above, courts, legislatures, and scholars have 
discussed in depth whether the restrictions on non-competes might be 
justified based on the implications for innovation and economic 
96. See Estlund, supra note 63, at 408 (“An extremely broad waiver of the right to work
elsewhere after quitting, such as would be permitted under an ordinary contractual treatment of 
[noncompete] agreements, comes very close in effect to contracting away one’s inalienable right to 
quit. So the pall of the Thirteenth Amendment and its ban on involuntary servitude hangs over these 
agreements.”). 
97. See Moffat, Making Noncompetes Unenforceable, supra note 14, at 943-51. 
98. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600. 
99. One example is Colorado, in which non-competes are prohibited except under a few set
of circumstances. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113. 
100. See Lohr, supra note 5. 
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development. But the best way to understand the hesitation of courts and 
legislatures to take a pure freedom of contract approach is that there are 
real concerns regarding the voluntariness in fact of the formation of such 
agreements and regarding the public policy implications of the 
enforcement of those agreements.101 In fact, this uneasiness with non-
competition agreements circles back to the problem of restricting the 
free flow of labor.102 Even if non-competes do not raise Thirteenth 
Amendment issues, they harken back to a time of involuntary servitude: 
the concern is precisely one of ownership of labor. 
E. Who Owns the Rights and How May They be Conveyed?
At least as important as defining the subject matter of an
intellectual property right is determining who owns the right and how it 
may be transferred. Fundamental to a property right is the concept of 
alienability. A thing, including an intangible thing, is more economically 
valuable if it can be sold, rented, or assigned. With intellectual property, 
where ownership vests initially is of particular importance so that it is 
clear who may exploit or transfer the rights.103 
For a patentable invention, the rights vest in the inventor or the 
inventors, but things are different if the invention arises on the job. If the 
employee was “hired to invent,” the employer may own the invention 
and has the right to seek patent protection104 (The inventor will be listed 
as such, but does not have ownership rights.). In some instances, the 
original inventor will be the owner of the invention, but the employer 
will have “shop rights,” conferring the ability to exploit the invention 
along with the inventor.105 
The situation is similar, but not identical, with respect to expressive 
works and copyright. An expressive work is protected under the 
Copyright Act as soon as the work is “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression,”106 and the creator is the presumptive owner.107 Under the 
101. I will not delve into the voluntariness question here, but suffice it to say that many non-
compete agreements are most often form agreements, entered into after the employee has already 
bargained regarding the position and often presented only after the employee has started work. See, 
e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 980. 
102. See Estlund, supra note 63. 
103. The classic discussion of alienability (and inalienability) in property law (and tort law) is
Guido Calabresi and Doulas Melamed’s article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
104. See William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer’s Rights to His Employee’s 
Inventions, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1983). 
105. Id. 
106. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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work-made-for-hire doctrine, however, the copyright rights vest in the 
hiring party when the work is created by an employee acting within the 
scope of her employment or, for certain categories of works, when there 
is an agreement to the effect that the hiring party is the owner.108 
These doctrines provide a fairly high degree of certainty about who 
owns an inventive or creative work and, therefore, who may exploit—by 
sale, by license, by development—the work, a characteristic that is 
fundamental to the property-like nature of intellectual property. There 
can be no market for an item, even—or perhaps especially—an 
intangible item, in the absence of well-defined subject matter and ability 
to exchange that subject matter. Alienability is crucial. 
It is this question of alienability that is so difficult in the context of 
human capital. To the extent that a non-compete has the effect of 
seeking to control human capital, it is an effort at alienation of a portion 
of the labor, knowledge, and skills of an individual person. It is, like 
many transfers of rights, a limited one: most non-compete agreements 
limit the ability of a worker to work for competitors of the employer, 
often in a particular geographic region for a specific, limited, period of 
time. 
Even this limited transfer of rights raises serious concerns, 
however. For employees in the high-tech world, or those in other 
knowledge-intensive industries (and even for those in low-tech 
positions), a non-compete agreement can mean the inability to work in 
one’s chosen profession, in many cases foreclosing meaningful 
alternative employment entirely. The fact that so many states take such a 
hard look at non-competes indicates that these public policy 
considerations are significant. 
It should be noted that some states have taken the position that 
human capital is simply inalienable – that non-compete agreements are 
unenforceable. While this might seem surprising from a contracts 
perspective, when it is viewed in terms of the alienation of human 
capital it is much less surprising. And viewed this way, the analogy to 
intellectual property appears to be particularly inappropriate. 
F. How Long Does Protection Last?
Unlike real property, which can be owned in perpetuity, the
copyright and patent terms are time-limited. The Constitution requires 
107. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work.”). 
108. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “works made for hire”). 
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that such rights are to be granted to owners and inventors for “Limited 
Times” only.109 The Patent Act provides for a term of protection of 
twenty years from the application date;110 the Copyright term is much 
longer: life of the author plus an additional seventy years.111 Trade 
secrets are not governed by the Intellectual Property clause and can last 
in perpetuity, but only so long as they remain secret.112 As a practical 
matter, the majority of trade secrets enter the public domain at some 
point. 
This fundamental characteristic of intellectual property sets it apart 
from real property. For both, alienability is crucial, but the calculation 
regarding the necessity of perpetual rights is different. For intellectual 
property, the public benefit of a growing public domain is deemed to 
outweigh the benefits that might accrue to owners in perpetuity. 
This is not a significant problem with respect to human capital in 
that even the most egregious non-competes tend to be limited in terms of 
temporal scope. And certainly a one- or two-year restriction is less 
problematic than a ten-year limit, or an indefinite one. This is hardly a 
saving grace, however. Given the personal autonomy and dignitary 
concerns presented by non-compete agreements, even short periods of 
restriction are problematic. In many cases, the affected employee may be 
unable to work in her chosen field or in the location where she resides 
for some significant period of time. The implications of this will vary 
from person to person and from field to field, but the basic problem 
remains: non-compete restrictions impose serious and real burdens on 
employees and their “limited” nature and terms does not change that 
fact. 
G. Are There Boundary Principles? How do the Different Forms of IP
Relate to Each Other?
A final, crucial, piece of the way in which the intellectual property
system works is as exactly that—a system. To a large extent, copyright, 
patent, and trade secret rights are defined in ways that acknowledge the 
interaction between the three; each of those regimes has doctrines that 
work to define the boundaries between the systems; and those doctrines 
work to keep each regime somewhat, though not completely, separate 
109. U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
111. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
112. 1-6 Taxation of Intellectual Property § 6.15 (2016). 
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from the others.113 The channeling doctrines, as they are called, place 
patent law at the center—or perhaps at the top—of the system, and they 
focus on ensuring that items that are or might be patentable do not 
receive another form of protection instead of or in addition to patent 
protection.114 
With respect to the boundary between patent law and copyright 
law, copyright’s useful article doctrine attempts to draw a bright line 
between the two fields of protection. Patent law covers only useful 
inventions,115 and the useful article doctrine in copyright law provides 
that “useful” items or any useful aspect of a creative work may not be 
protected under copyright law.116 Although determining what constitutes 
a useful article in the context of industrial design or fashion, for 
example, is a far from easy task in practice, the principle—and the 
policy behind that principle—is clear.117 Patent law involves a clear 
trade-off: a very strong set of rights, but with a limited term, so that 
useful inventions are released to the public within a reasonable time. If 
an inventor can get a monopoly-form of protection, even if it is the 
weaker form of copyright law, for a substantially longer period of time 
and with virtually no examination, the public is not likely to get its end 
of the bargain. In other words, copyright’s useful article doctrine seeks 
to prevent the run-aroundthe avoidance of the relatively rigorous 
patent review process and the relatively short term of protectionthat 
might otherwise occur.118 
There is also a dividing line between trade secret law and patent 
law.119 Some inventions are capable of remaining “secret” even if they 
113. This is also true of the trademark regime, and there are channeling principles that create a 
dividing line between trademark law and patent law, and between trademark law and copyright law. 
114. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
873 (2009). 
115. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). 
117. See Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 (2014)
(discussing the policy reasons underlying the useful article doctrine). 
118. Trademark law has a similar doctrine—functionality—that serves the same purpose.
Although trademark law does not provide the same broad, property-like kind of protection that 
patent and copyright do, the functionality doctrine nonetheless serves to channel “functional” works 
away from trademark protection. As with the copyright’s useful article doctrine, functional items 
may not receive trademark protection; this does not mean that they will necessarily be protected by 
patent law. Thus, a variety of “useful” and “functional” items will be free to the public for copying, 
unless they are protected in some other way. 
119. The line between copyright law and trade secret law is not such a bright one.
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are sold on the marketthe formula for Coca-Cola being perhaps the 
most famous examplewhile others are simply incapable of being 
secret once they are released to the public. A revolutionary mousetrap, 
for example, is likely to be easily reverse-engineered once it is available. 
In either case, though, if the inventor or owner chooses to patent the 
once-secret invention, the details must be disclosed to the Patent & 
Trademark Office, and then to the public within eighteen months of the 
patent application.120 An inventor or the owner of valuable information 
thus must make an election between trade secret protection and patent 
protection in those cases where both might apply. 
The analogy of human capital to intellectual property also is inapt 
when we consider the idea that the intellectual property regimes are part 
of a broader system for protection of intangible assets. It simply does not 
make sense to think about human capital in the same terms that we think 
about a patentable invention or a copyrightable work, primarily because 
those things are the products of human ingenuity, of human capital itself. 
To conceive of human capital as another form of IP does not just blur the 
lines between the other forms of intellectual property but turns the 
notion on its head. 
III. CONCLUSION
In effect, non-competes provide a partial form of new protection for 
intangible human creation and invention. While they are often justified 
on the basis that they are necessary to more fully protect trade secrets, 
and in that way they operate as a kind of meta-trade secret protection, 
they also operate much more broadly than that, seeking to control 
substantially more than the employer’s trade secrets. By limiting the 
employment possibilities for employees, non-competes seek to control 
not only the output of human ingenuity and creativity, but also the 
source of itthe human capital itself. 
Taking employers’ arguments seriously and evaluating non-
competes and the way that non-competes control human capital, as an 
effort to create and control a new form of intellectual property, reveals 
that the IP justification for non-competes is not sustainable. It simply 
Copyrightable works may be submitted in redacted form—a software designer can keep secret 
portions of the code and still receive copyright protection, for example. As a practical matter, 
however, most expressive works—with the (significant) exception of computer code—are difficult 
to exploit in the marketplace while remaining secret. A novel cannot be read by millions and be a 
secret; a musical composition is apparent to the ear of every listener. By their very subject matter, 
then, copyright and trade secret subject matter do not overlap significantly, except for code. 
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 122. 
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falls apart upon close examination and would be unworkable (and 
possibly unconstitutional) if it were made explicit. 
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Appendix A 
Recent Legislative Action 
See: Alabama (HB 352)—revised its general prohibition to include 
more detail about what is permitted. 
Arkansas (Act 921)—added a new section allowing non-competes 
with many specifications. 
Connecticut (SB 00351)—prohibits non-competes for physicians. 
Hawaii (HB 1090/Act 158)—prohibits non-competes in the tech 
industry. A bill prohibiting them in the health care industry was deferred 
indefinitely in February. 
Idaho (HB487)—amended statute to create rebuttable presumption 
of irreparable harm if “key employee” breaches non-compete agreement. 
Illinois (SB3163)—”Freedom to Work Act” prohibits non-
competes for low-wage employees. 
Nebraska (LB942)—requires disclosure of existing non-compete 
agreements in transactions for sales of businesses. 
New Hampshire (NH Rev Stat 275.70)—added a section effective 
in July 2014 requiring an employer to provide a copy of the non-
compete agreement before an employee accepts an offer of employment. 
New Mexico (SB0325)—prohibits non-competes for health-care 
practitioners. 
Oregon (2015 ORS 653.295)—reduces reasonable time from two 
years to eighteen months. Oregon’s major revisions were in 2008, 
effective in 2009. The bill this year made only this amendment. 
Rhode Island (H7586)—prohibits non-competes for physicians. 
Utah (HB0251)—”Post-Employment Restrictions Act” limits non-
compete agreements entered into after May 10, 2016 to a period of one 
year. 
Bills that were introduced but have not been enacted 
Maryland (HB 506)—would prohibit non-compete agreements. 
Received an “unfavorable committee report” in March and went no 
further. 
Maryland, Michigan, and New York all had bills prohibiting non-
compete agreements for low-wage workers. The bills in Michigan and 
Maryland did not pass but the NY bill went to the Senate Rules 
Committee in June.  
Massachusetts came close to passing a law imposing restrictions 
on non-compete agreements (this was the ninth attempt,) but the 
competing House and Senate versions died in a conference committee on 
July 31, the last day of the legislative session. Below are summaries of 
the two bills and the texts are attached: 
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https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/07/11/massachusetts-
noncompete-bill-enhanced-by-senate/ (highlights of Senate bill). 
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/07/15/lining-up-the-
massachusetts-senate-and-house-noncompete-utsa-bills/ (comparison of 
House and Senate bills). 
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/08/01/massachusetts-
noncompete-law-stalls/ (bill died as of July 31, end of legislative 
session). 
Michigan (HB4198)—would change “employer” to “a purchaser of 
business goodwill or a business interest” and “employee” to “owner, 
principal or officer of the seller’s business” in the existing statute that 
permits non-compete agreements, and would add some additional 
conditions for them to be enforceable. It was referred to a committee in 
February. 
New York (see this link: http://tinyurl.com/npt3zpm)—would 
prohibit non-compete agreements as a restraint of trade. Numerous bills 
with identical language were introduced earlier this year and all were 
referred to committee. 
Pennsylvania (HB336)—would prohibit for health-care 
practitioners. Referred to committee in February. 
Washington (HB1577)—specifies when non-compete is prohibited 
and conditions for enforceability. Appears to be still pending. 
Wisconsin (SB69)—would repeal current law regarding non-
competes and create “restrictive covenants” enforceable under certain 
conditions. Referred to committee in March. 
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